Housing Tenure, Uncertainty, and Taxation by Harvey S. Rosen et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES




Working Paper No. 1168




We are grateful to Richard Quandt for useful suggestions. The
research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in
Taxation and project in Government Budgets. Any opinions expressed
are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.BER Working Paper #1168
July 1983
Modern empirical work on the choice between renting and owning focuses
on the concept of the "user cost" of housing, which integrates into a single
measure the various components of housing costs. The standard approach
implicitly assumes that households know the user cost of housing with
certainty.However, the ex post user cost measure exhibits substantial
variabilityover time, and it is highly unlikely that individuals believe
themselves able to forecast these fluctuations with certainty. In this
paper, we construct andestimate amodel of the tenure choice that explicitly
allows for the effects of uncertainty. The results suggest that previous
work which ignored uncertainty may have overstated the effects of the













Housing Tenure, Uncertainty, And Taxation
ABSTRACT1.
I. Introduction
The personal income tax provisions associated with homeownership have
come under increasing scrutiny by both policymakers and academicresearchers.
This renewed interest has come about primarily because of the tremendous
acceleration of real house prices in the past decade and the belief that
Americans invest "too much" in owner-occupied housing relative to investment
in more productive plant and equipment. (Feldstein [1982], Hendershott
£1982].) Both phenomena are blamed in part on the interaction of inflation
and the treatment of owner-occupied housing in the federal income tax sy:em.
The non-taxation of implicit rental income, the deductibility of nominal
interest payments and property taxes, and the virtual exclusion of housing
capital gains from taxable income are all believed to provide incentivcfor
households to become owner-occupiers.
Modern empirical work on the choice between renting and owning focuses
on the concept of the "user cost" of housing, which integratesinto a single
measure the various components of housing costs: interest rates, property
and income taxes, maintenance, depreciation, expected capital gains, etc.
A typical approach is to compute theex post value of the user costof owner
occupation each period, and then estimate a regression of the proportionof
owner-occupiers in the population on the user cost and othervariables. This
approach has been fairly successful in explaining the movementof the homeowner-
ship ratio over time. (Rosen and Rosen [1980], Hendershottand Shilling [1980].)
The standard approach implicitly assumes that households knowthe user
cost of housing with certainty. However, the expost usercost measure
exhibits substantial variability over time, and it is highly unlikelythat
individuals believe themselves able to forecast thesefluctuations with- 2.
certainty. Since housing decisions are usually made over time horizons of
several years, this uncertainty can have important consequences for behavior.
Ignoring it can lead to incorrect predictions of how people will behave under
certain conditions. Consider these two examples:
1) During a period of time, housing prices increase substantially year
after year. Ex post measures of the user cost of owner-occupation suggest
that families should become homeowners in order to reap the capital gains.
However, individuals do not know ex ante that these gains will occur. Indeed,
past price increases may increase their subjective uncertainty concerning
future movements in price. To the extent that they are risk averse, this increase
in uncertainty will discourage people from becoming homeowners.1
2) The government announces that it will begin taxing housing capital
gains at the same rates as ordinary income. Focusing only on the ex post
user cost suggests that such a policy will decrease the incidence of owner—
occupation in the population. But the policy also lowers the variance of
the user cost of homeownership--the government in effect becomes a silent
partner, sharing both gains and losses. If individuals arerisk-averse,this
will tend to increase the attractiveness of owner-occupation, ceteris paribus.
In this paper, we construct and estimate a simple model of the tenure
choice that explicitly allows for the effects of uncertainty. Section II
presents the basic model and Section III discusses econometric issues involved
in its estimation. Section IV presents the results and some of their
implications. Price uncertainty is shown to have a statistically significant
11n fact, during the 1O's, substantial increases in house prices
occurred with barely any movemc; ts in the proportion of homeowne's (See
Rosen [1981].)3-
andquantitatively large impact on the percentage of cwner-occupiers. The
results suggest that previous work which ignored uncertainty may have ov'—
stated tax effects on tenure choice. Section V provides a summary and
suggestions for additional research.
II. The Model
In this section we develop a model of household tenure choice which
focuses on the role of price uncertainty. Assume that an individual': utility
depends upon his consumption of housing services and of a composite of all
other goods. Housing services are assumed available in either of two inuually
exclusive modes; renting or owning. For simplicity, renting and owning are
modelled as distinct commodities with characteristics which differ. For
example, it may be difficult to rent a single unit with a large backyard.
Similarly,itmaybe impractical for a homeowner to contract for the kind of
maintenance servicesavailable to a renter.2 Algebraically, if Gquantity
of the composite good, H =quantity.of housing services consumed in owner-
occupation mode, and R =housingservices consumed in rental mode, then
U =U(G,H,R)
where U() is the utility function, and HXR =0
At the time the tenure choice is made, the future real prices of both modes
are uncertain. As will be shown below, the real cost of owner-occupation (P)
depends inter alia upon future housing capital gains, interest rates, and
2Henderson and loannides [1983] provide a useful discussion of the
distinctions between renting and owning.14.
federal income tax rates; none of which is known with certainty. Similarly,
in the absence of long run indexed leases for rental housing, uncertainty
also surrounds its real price (Q) .Theprice of the composite good is
assumed to be known with certainty, and is equal to unity.
The individual makes his choice by comparing the outcomes of two sub—
problems. The first is maximizing utility, assuming that owner occupation
is selected, and the second is maximizing utility assuming that renting is
selected. Let V'(P,y) be the maximum utility associated with owning,
and Vr(Q,Y) be the maximum utility associated with renting; where y is permanent
income over the planning period. An individual elects to own if:
E[Vh(P, y) —Vr(Q,s,)] >
Defining the expected prices of horneownership and renting as P and
Q, respectively, and taking a second-order Taylor series expansion of h . —
V(F, y) around the point (F, y) yields:
y)] y) + .-V1(,y)
where V1 :2 and E(P )2 Similarly:
ECV'(Q, y)] V', y) + .!:v:1c•,
y) .
2r
___ 2_—2 where V E and =E(Q-Q) .Hence,we can write:
1
E[Vh(P,y) -Vr(Q,Yfl -V'(Q,y)÷v1(P, y)• 2 r(-Y).2
Onethus expects that (to a second or. r approximation) the
tenure choice will depend uDon: i) the expected prices f the
modes (F, Q) and ii) the variation of actual prices aboutthe5.
forecast (02 and These latter terms (referred to herein as the forecast
error variances) figure importantly in our test of the relevance of uncertuinty
to tenure choice.4
Ourfocus has been on the tenure choice atan individual le;el. Aggregation
presentstheusual difficulties, but may be motivated by considering a
population with heterogeneous tastes and incomes, but identical expectations
for future prices. For individual i ,define
E(Vh1 -
where is a vector of taste parameters. Integrating over the joint
distribution of y1 and in the population for year t yields the
relation
— — 22 ="Pt, 5t'
, (2.1)
where is the aggregate proportion of homeowners.
For purposes of empirical implementation, a specific functional form must
be adopted for (2.1). We assume the converient specification
in C
i_e
= +lt + 2t + $30t + 8Lt + 5't + (2.2)
where is a random error. Symmetry in obtaining housing services via
renting and owning suggests
=i
= (2.3)
These restrictions will be tested below.
3Note that as a consequence of the assumption that renting and ownership
are mutually exclusive, the covariance between the prices does not enter.. -
Further,it is assumed that permanent income is independent of the pricP, Q
4Lt should be stressed that the variance terms are consequences of
underlying uncertainty in the price of housing, and not the result of asset
portfolio considerations. The interaction of housing and financial decisions is
beyond the scope of this paper.6.
III. Empirical Im1ementation
We estimate equation (2.2) with annual U.S. data for 1956 -to 1979. In
this section we explain the construction of empirical counterparts to the
theoretical constructs of Section II. The sources of all data are documented
in Appendix B.
1. The proportion of homeowners (&)
Although a time series is available for census years, had to be
constructed for noncensus years using a perpetual inventory method. (See
Appendix B for details.) Jaffee and Rosen [1979] argue that demographic
changes in the U.S. population have had a major effect on the rate of household
formation and hoineownership, and that meaningful comparison of homeownership
rates over time requires that such changes be taken into account. We adapt
the Jaffee-Rosen procedure, which consists of creating a series
which controls for the changing mix of household types due to changes
in the age distribution of the population and alterations in marriage
and divorce patterns.
2. The expected price of owner-occupation ()
Computationof the price of owner—occupation is complicated by the fact
that owners do not pay an explicit annual rent for housing. An important
part of the annual cost of owner-occupied housing services is the unobservable
opportunity cost of the owner's equity in the house. Moreover, the federal
income tax lowers the effective cost by allowing deductions of mortgage
interest payments and local propertytaxes.5 Finally, like any other asset,
anticipated capital gains on a house (either positive or negative) have an
5See Congressional Budget Office £1981] for a detailed discussion of
the tax provisions related to husing.7.
impact upon its effective rental price. Readers familiar with the neoclassical
investment literature will recognize the similarity between ccstructing the
price of owner-occupied housing services and the "user cost of capital."
(See, e.g., Jorgenson [1971].)
The construction of user costs for housing is now familiar, and there is
no need to go through the derivation again in detail.6 Let Vt =themarket
value of a house in period t, r =theindividual's opportunity cost of
capital, rmtthe mortgage rate, D depreciation, Mt =maintenance,and
Tt =propertytaxes. If the share of owner's equity in the house is






where is the marginal income tax rate in period t, V is the expected
capital gain in period t, and PLt is an index of the general price level.7
Data on mortgage rates are not available for the entire sample period, nor
is there sufficient information to allow calculation of .Wetherefore
assume that rmt =rtwhich makes irrelevant. For r ,theAAA
corporate bond rate is used. No time series data are available on the
depreciation arid maintenance costs of the stock of owner-occupied housing.
Following general real estate practice, we take depreciation and maintenance
each to be 1 percent of the house value, V .Propertytaxes are computed
as the average noncommercial property tax per owner-occupied dwelling. The
6Dougherty and Van Order [1982] provide a careful derivation.
7Expression (3.1) ignores transactions costs.8.
term is the average marginal tax rate on income as calculated byJoines
[19811.8 PLt is the implicit price deflator for total consumption expenditures
with base year 1972. (PL1972 =1.0.)
Substituting all of these variables into (3.1) gives us only the ex post
cost of owner-occupation in year t ,whileour theory suggests that tenure
decisions are based upon the expected annual cost over the relevant horizon.
Only if expectations are myopic will people expect the current real price to
continue into the future. Because expected housing prices are not directly
observable, they must be constructed on the basis of some model. There has
been a long and sometimes acrimonious debate on just how expectations are
formed.(Nuch of the discussion is reviewed by Friedman [1979].)
We use the optimal ARIMA forecasting procedure suggested byBox
and Jenkins [1970]. The Box-Jenkins model producesforecasts of a variable
based only on past values. Conditional onthis information, the forecasts
are rational. In principle, one mightwant to forecast using a completely
specified econometric model.This, however, would require forecasting all of
the model's exogenous variables into thefuture. In a similar context,
Feldsteifl and SummerS [1978] argue, "Thereis no reason to expect that the
more general procedure that requires
estimates of monetary and fiscal 'olicy
formany years ahead would ye1dbetter forecasts than the simplerBox-Jenkins
procedure." (pp. 2-6).
Forecasts made at any given time arebased only on information available
atthat time. (Current year prices are notincluded in the information set,
but all lags are. Thus, it is recessaryto estimate a separate
8cr a variety of reasons, it is diffiu1t to say exactly which tax rate
is relevant.L.rst of all, not all horrcwners itemize their deductior.
Secon;ly, Hendershott and Slemrod Cl92l. r.e that the appropriatevariable
is the average tax savings er dollar duetohomeowoarship. We believe that
the marginal rate used here provides a good approxiition.9.
equation for each year, based upon observations prior to that year. It is
not obvious how far into the past the observatious for each forecasting
equation should go. One possible procedure is to choo3e some arbitrary lengti
of time (say 10 years) and assume that individuals use data only within that
period to make their forecasts. Each year a new observation is added, and
simultaneously the observation at the end of the sample is dropped. This
method is sometimes called 'troiling regression."9
Another possibility is that as more information becomes available over
time, individuals employ it, but continue to use the older inf:rrntion as
well. Thus, the number of observations grows each year.People
believe that the basic economic structure generating the observations remains
the same, but they use new information to update their estimates of the
structure's parameters. For practical purposes, a starting point is
needed. If World WarIIis perceived as an important breaking point in
economic history, then starting somewhere in the late 1940's is sensible.
Essentially, this is no different than the typical practice of using all
available post-War data to estimate macroeconomic relationships.
There is not much theoretical basis for choosing between the two assumptions
on how information is processed. We tried both and found that the second
performed better in the sense of lsading to a statistically superior
explanation of the tenure choice. The results presented below are based on
this method.
After some preliminary analysis of the time series on ,weselected
an ARIMA (1,1,0) equation to make forecasts in year T
9Some justifications for rolling regression are discussed by Friedman




— +Ut ,(to,...,T—1) (3.2)
where u is a normally distributed white noise error and 4)(T) is a
parameter to beestimated)0 Again, note that (3.2) is re-estimated eachyear
T with observations from year 0 to T-l .Withina given time period 4)(T)
is constant, but as the time period changes, so does 4)(T) .(Inpractice,
year 0 is 1946, and the first 4)isestimated for 1956.)
Given an estimate of 4)(T) ,sayT) ,equation(3.2) can be solved
recursively to generate forecasts of the price of homeownership for as many
future years from time T as desired. This raises the question of the
horizon people consider when making their tenure choice decisions. One
possibility is that individuals look only to the end of the current year,
reasoning that they can always change tenure status after that time. More
realistically, substantial transactions costs are involved inmoving, and
one expects that people are concerned about the course of prices at least
several years into the future. We assume that people form expectations not
only for the current year but four years into the future, and base their
tenure choice on the five year average. That is, if we denote T+5 as
the simple average of the first five forecasts generated by the Tth version
of equation (3.2), then P-g is entered as the observation for P
equation(2.2). To test the sensitivity of our substantive results to this
assumption on horizon length, we also estimated the tenure choice equation
asurning that decisions are made on a one-year basis. These re:ults are 1so
reported below.
101t is possible to view the ARIMA(1,1,O) mod1 of equ.3tiorl (3.2)a:
the .'R(2) model = +2-2 + u
with the con:tra.rit +2 =
Atest on this c istraint using observations from 1939 to 1979 indicated that
it 'z consistent with the data--F(l,37)2.08, while the critical level at a
0.05 significance level is i4.08. Nce also that with the normazy assumptior,
the distribution of P. can be :hacterized by its mean and vr.ar.ce with no
element of apDroximatin.
11For an estimate of the transactions costa associ3ted w.th moving, see VtndWise 11982].11.
Figure3.1 shows the value of 3(T) for each year. Note that the estimates
vary substantially as new information becomes available. Hence, attempts
to model expectations formation on the basis of a single ARIMA model esi'. 'ed
for the entire period would likely produce misleading inferences. To the
extent there is a trend, the value of 3(T) tends toward zero. As equation
(3.2) indicates, a decrease of c(T) in absoL.te value suggests that relatively
more weight is being placed on the most recent observation. This may he due
to the increased volatility in which occurred during the 1970's. This
phenomenon, associated mainly with movements in nominal interest rates and
capitalgains, reduced the value of "old" information.
Figure3.2 exhibits for each year the expected price of owner—occupation
over a five year period,P.g. ,andcompares them to the average of the
actual (ex post) prices for the same period. Due to the nature of the learning
process imposed by equation (3.2), individuals react to turning points with a
one period lag. Note that in the 1970's, people often expected the cos of
housing to be higher than its ex post value. This may help explain the
relatively small change in the homeownership rate during that decade.
It should be noted that our procedure assumes that people form
expectations of the real user cost, as a whole. It is equally plausible
that agents forecast each component of the user cost and then aggregate.
The latter procedure,however, is difficult to implement. The investigator
must specify and estimate an ARIMA model of each component. Correctly
aggregating involves, at a minimum, computing the covariances between
separate ARIMA models. The non-linear nature of equation 3.1 complicates
matters further. For these reasons, our simpler procedure was adopted
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TEIRI9
1.970 1.973 1.376 •t3791L..
Also reported below however, areestimates based on
a model in which real capital gains arethe only source of uncertainty. This
assumption has been used in earlier studies of tenurechoice (Hendershott
and Shilling [1980], Rosen and Rosen [1980]) and studies ofbusiness
investment (Jorgenson [1971]).
3. The forecast error variance of the priceof owner occupation (a).
The same equations used to generate the expected priceof owner occupation
can be used to produce a series ofthe forecast error variances. From
equations (3.2), at hestart of year T the one year ahead forecast, ,is
=(1+$(T))PT_l_11(T)PT...2
The true value one year hence (conditional on3.2) is
=(l+(T))PT_l_(T)PT_2+ UT
The error in the one year ahead forecast made
at the start of year T is (P.,. -
andits variance
a2 =&2(T)+ E {(3(T)$(T))(PTf T-2 -Ea(T)_(T))c-PT_2)}2
where a2(T) is the year T estimate of thevariance of
Two simplifying assumptions can be made:
(a) The covariance of 3(T) with the data onwhich it is estimated
1 'T-
is zero. To compute it is burdensome, and itis plausible
that people ignore. this source •f e'ror.In this case, equation (3.t)
reduces to
a2 2(T) + T—i T-2(T)
where aT) is the estimated ,arianceofQ(T), computed as usual as15.
-i-
(b) (T) =0.Thissimplifying assumption is made in virtually all
ARIMA forecasting. (See Nelson [1973].) Intuitively, it is assumedthat
there are enough observations so that errors of estimationare of second orcer
importance relative totheinherent uncertainty (UT' inthe world. We
then find
(1= â2(T) (3.5)
Expressions (3.5) and (3.6) give alternative values for the forecast
error variance of a one year forecast. Our framework, however, requires
c.mputing the variance for a five year average. This leads to two complications:
a. It must be assumed that 3(T) is known with certainty. Recall that
in the case of the one-year forecast, one can choose between assuming
that T) is known with certainty or uncertainty. For the former, equation
(3.6) is used; for the latter, equation (3.5) is relevant. Once we forecast
further into the future, the computational problem becomes intractable unless
2 we assume that
'(T)
=0.Thisis because each forecast error variance
contains expectations of third and higher order moments of T)
In an attempt to gauge the importance of assuming 3(T) is knownwith
certainty, we estimated two different tenure choice equations with the
maintained hypothesis that one-year ahead forecasts were appropriate. In
the first was estimated using (3.5); in the second, (3.6). The
results, which are presented below, indicate that the substantive results are
unaffected. Of course, we do not know that this would continue to be the
case for the five-year horizon; but the result is suggestive.16.
b. The variance of the five year average is not siTnply the average of the
five variances. The computation must take into account the covariances between
the forecast errors for the various years. Some tedious but straightforward







[5 ÷ 43(T) +3(T)2÷23(T)3+3(T)4]
= [Li. + 3(T)+23(T)2+3(T)3)
Figure 3.3 shows how the five year average forecast error var.ance changed
over time. The general tendency has been for it tofall.13 This is reflective
of the pattern of actual prices depicted in Figure 3.2. Although prices in
the beginning of the period moved le5s than those at the end, they did so
in a less "predictable" way.
12Details are provided in Appendix A.
13Ageneraldownward trend interrupted inabout1975 was also found in
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LI..Theexpected value and forecast error variance of the price of rental
housing, and
The same strategy is used to compute and as was used for
and above. A series of equations of the form
- = (T)(Qi- +v (t0,... ,T-1) (3.7)
are estimated, and the results are used to generate expected valuesand
• l4likethe case of owner occupation, it is not necessary to variances. Un
construct a time series on .Explicitrents are paid to landlords,
15
and data on them are easily available.
Over the period, the ex post real price of renting rises smoothly, as does
the forecast value. The forecast error variances of renting are verysmall
compared to that associated with owner-occupation. It seems likely
that risks associated with owning are most important to the tenure
decision.
5. Other variables
Our theoretical discussion suggested that permanentincome should have an
effect on housing decisions. Muth [1960, p.30J and others have noted that
iLl.Again,this time series proc'.was 1ected after prel maryinvestigation.
15There are, of course, a number of government pr..:ramSthat act to
subsidize rental housing. However,all thatmattersfrom our point of view
is the market price facing consumers,nd tnis i pre.ise1y what thetubiished
data are intended to ref1ct.19.
current consumption is probably a better "proxy" for permanent income that is
current income. We therefore include per capita real cons'rption C ,as
16
a righthand side variable.
An important issue in the housing literature is the extent to which credit
rationing influences housing demand decisions. (See Arcelus and Meltzer
[1973] and Swan [1973].) A rigorous examination of the impact of credit
rationing on the tenure decision would require specification and estimation
of a disequilibrium model as suggested by Fair and Jaffee [1972]. A simpler
approach is to include among the regressors a measure of the availability
of mortgage market funds. For this purpose, we create the variable CREDt
defined as the real growth in deposits at thrift institutions (mutual
savings banks and savings and loan associations) between years t-l and t.
Oneexpects that ifcredit availability has been a factor in the homeownership
decision, then CRED will have a positive sign.
IV. Results
A. The Basic Model
Inour basicequation, expected prices and their forecast error variances
arecomputedover a 5 year horizon. In terms of quation (2.2), =
a2= , andSand are defined analogously. Under these assumptions,
and imposing constraints (2.3),17 ordinary least squares estimation of (2.2)
16The consumption variable includes expenditures on housing. Conceptually,
this is appropriate, because the idea is to proxy permanent income, and all
components of the consumption stream "belong." Simultaneity is not likely to
be an important issue because the dependent variable is a function of the
homeownership ratio, notusing expenditures per'se. In any case,when consumption
net of housing expenditures is used the results are essentially unchanged.
17preliminary invtigation indicated that the hypothesis that constraint
(2.3) is applicable could not be rejected by the data. The F-statistic for










The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The Durbin-Watson statistic
is inconclusive at 5% and does not reject the null hypothesis at a 1% level.
In any case, when a first-order correction for autocorrelation is i.ade, the
outcome is virtually unchanged.
The coefficient on - isnegative and statistically significant
at conventional levels. When the expected excess of the cost of owning over
renting increases, the proportion of owner-occupiers decreases. The elasticity
of with respect to -is_0.053.18 This result is qualitatively
consistent with earlier research.
The key new variable introduced in our specification is the difference in
the forecast error variances of the costs of owning and renting, —
Thecoefficient on this term is negative and exceeds its standard error by
nearly a factor of 4. Greater uncertainty in the price of owning reduces
the proportion of homeowners, ceteris paribus. The elasticity of G with
respect to (c —) is—0.188.
The coefficient of the consumption variable is positive and statistically
significant, with an implied elasticity of 0.707. As in previous work using
18A11 elasticities are evaluated at the average sample values fcr' 197—79.
Bec.use of the substantial volatility i the underlying data, the e1asicity
calculated for any si'7le yearmightbe mis1eadirg.21.
both cross sectional and time series data, there isa positive elaticshit
between real per capita permanent income (as proiedby personal consumptior
expenditures) and the tendency to choose ow:er—occupjer status.
One potential difficulty with our estimates is thatthey may be incnsistent
due to simultaneity bias. If i1creases in the proportion ofowner occupiers
drives up the price of owner—occupied housing, then there will becorrelatic:.
between (Pt - andthe error term .Recently,Plosser, Schwert and
White [1981] proposed a specification test which can be used toinvestigate
whether this is a serious problem. Theirprocedure requires
estimating the model in levels and differenced form. tinder the null hypothesis
that is i.i.d. and there is no simultaneity bias, the estirrtes will
be identical. The test statistic, chi-squared distributed with 3degrees
of freedom, is 1.3214, indicating a failure to reject the nullhypothesis by
a wide margin.
B. Alternative Specifications
To test the robustness of the basic model several additional specifications
were estimated. In the first, the credit variable (CRED) described earlier
was added to the basic equation. The results are shown in column (2) of
Table I. (Column (1) reproduces the results of the basic equation for convenience.)
The results in column (2) show that the addition ofCREDt leaves the basic
results essentially unchanged. The CREDt term itself is insignificant. At
least in ourformulation,the availability of real mortgage credit does not
influence the homeownership decision. As stressed earlier, we do not regard
this as decisive "proof" that rationing is unimportant in the housing market.
The basic model assumed that households used a five-year horizon for































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































year decision horizon was postulated. The results in coiumnC) are based on
the assumption that the autoregressive parameter in the equation that
generates price expectations is known with certainty. Hence,
of equation (3.6); and and are computed &ia1ogousir.
Column4is based on the assumption that the autoregressive parame' is
uncertain--cy
= ofequation (3.5), and is computed analogously.
Taken together, the results of columns (3) and (4) show that: Ci)fr-cbasi'.
estimates of column (1) are not very sensitive to reasonabLe changes in the
time horizon, and (ii) neither are they sensitive to the assumption that the
autoregressive parameter in the price expectations equations is known with
certainty.
Column (5) shows the results when the user cost of borne owning jFcomputed
under the "traditional" assumption that the only unknown component is the
expected real capital gain. Specifically, we estimated a series of ARIMA
models for real capital gains, and used them to compute the expected value
and forecast error variance over 5-year horizons, just as was done for the
entire user cost in Section III. The other components of were assumed
known with certainty. As the results indicate, not much changes. This is
not too surprising, since much of the variability in the series is
associated with changes in house value.
Finally, we estimated a version of the model trying to take into account
changes in the qualities of owner-occupied and rental housing over the period.
The only dimension of housing quality for which time series data are available
is the average size of rental and owner-occupied units. Column (6) reports
results when the user costs were scaled by average number of rooms for owner—
occupied and rental housing. (A five-year horizon is again assumed.) The
qualitative results are similar to those previously obtained, although the24.
coefficients differ as a result of the scaling. Of course, this is a crude
adjustment for quality change, but it is the only one available over the time
period.
C. Some Implications
To get a better feel for the quantitative significance of our results,
it is useful to employ them as the basis for a number of simulations.
Typically, simulations of the impact of changes in the housing environment
focus exclusively on the effects upon the user cost of housing. However,
any exogenous force which changes mean expected prices will also affect the
forecast error variances. To accommodate this problem, the following
simulation procedure was adopted:
1) A counterfactual was posed. For instance, "Whatwouldhave been the
effect upon the homeownership ratio if the growth rate of real house values
had been constant over the sample period?" (discussed below)
2) An artificial ex post user cost series was calculated by evaluating
equation (3.1) under the counterfactual hypothesis.
3) Equations(3.2)were re-estimated on the artificial data series,
resulting in new estimates of T). These were used to calculate expected
prices of home ownership and forecast error variances under the counterfactual.
4) The counterfactual series of price differentials and forecast errorvariance
differentials were substituted into the estimated behavioral equationt
(equation (4.1))to predict the homeownership ratio which would have obtained
under the counterfactual. Th avoid peculiarities associated with any
particular year,comparisons of actual and rnulated homeownership ratios are
presented on the basis of 5 year averages over 1975-1979.
The first proposition considered was the effect of a constant rjrate
in real house values((Vt/PLt )inequation (3.1)). To irvestigat2 this, we
created an artificial series whose endpoints matched the hi3torical record,25.
but which grewsnoo.lyat the rate of 3.l. yearly, and then fol1o:; the
simuiation procedure outlined above.
T. results indicate that a steady real growth rate in housing prices
wouldhave increased the proportion of owner-occupiers tr: the late 1970's
by +0.033'4. It is useful to "decompose" this figure into the rts due to
the change in the expected price difference, and the part due to the change in the
difference in the forecast error variances. If is held at its actual
valueand the artificial value of is substituted into equation (Lii), we
find that the proportion of owner-occupiers falls by 0.0072. Under the
simulation, capital gains in the latter part of the period are smaller than
historical values, so on the basis of expected price alone, owner-ccupaIion
is less desirable than it was in reality. On the other hand, if is
held at its actual value, and the artificial value of the forecast error
variance used, then the proportion of owner-occupiers increases by 0.OL1OE.
Clearly, the encouraging effect of less uncertainty dominates the outcome.
For reference, these results are recorded in column (1) of Table II.
We next gauged the impact of several proposed changes
in the tax treatment of housing. Suppose that during our sample period the
deduction of mortgage interest and property taxes had been disallowed, but
everything else had been the same. The results are recorded in column (2)
of Table II. Elimination of these deductions would have decreased the
proportion of owner-occupiers by 0.0O'iO. Most of the effect (.0036) comes
via changes in the expected price; elimination of the deductions does not
have much impact upon the forecast error variance.19
19The magnitude of this effect is somewhat smaller than that found in
earlier studies such as Hendershott and Shilling 11980] and Rosen and Rosen
[1980]. This is due in part to the fact that the marginal income tax rates
used in those studies exceed those computed by Joines [1981], which are the
ones used here. Hence, removal of any given tax deduction has a smaller
dollar effect on the user cost of housing in this paper than in its
predecessors.26.
TABLEII
CHANGEIN AVERAGE PROPORTION OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
DURING 1975 —1979*
Constant No Deductions,
Growth Rate of No Capital GainsCapital Gains
Housing Prices Deductions Taxed Taxed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TotalEffect +.0334 —.0040 +.0105 ÷.0063
Expected Price Effect —.0072 —.0036 —.0051 —.0089
Forecast Error
Variance Effect +.0406 —.0004 +.0156 +.0152
All comparisons are relative to the average fitted value of the basic equation for
1975-1979, 0.6833. The proportions are adjusted for changes in household composition
as described above.27.
Anothertax reform possibility is to tax 1ousing capital gains at ordi:'y
rates, but leave the other deductions in place. As shown in column (3) of
Table II, this change would have incread the propor-ti n o owner-occupiez
by 0.0105. This is a surprising result, but the other rigures in coJ (3)
revealits source. On the basis of expected price alone, we would ve
predicted a decrease of -.0051. However, theencouragingEFfect of the ix-
inducedreduction in the forecast error variance dominates the outcome.
This kind of result is familiar from the literature on taxati. and
uncertainty (Tobin [1958]). As far as we know, its reevance to the issue
of housing tenure choice has not been established before.
Finally,oDlumn (14.)recordsthe results when the interest and prcerty tax
deductions are removed and housing capital gains are taxed. 3n balance,
there is a very srill increase in the proportion of owner-occupiers. The
variance effect so strongly present in column (3) is mitigated to some extent
by the expected price effect of column(2)
V.Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the effects of price uncertainty on the
tenure choice decision. Estimates on data from 1956-1979 indicate that
uncertainty over the course of relative prices has significantly depressed
the aggregate proportion of homeowners.
Proposals to modify the tax treatment of housing affect both the expected
price differential between renting and owning and the difference in the
forecast error variances. Previous analyses of policy changes may be misleading
because the two effects can work in opposite directions. For example, our
results suggest that taxation of capital gains at marginal personal income
tax rates would have increased the horneownership rate, despite the increased28.
expected cost of owning. The reduction in price variance is sufficiently
attractive to dominate the outcome. Other results indicate that eliminating
propertytax and interest payment deductions would have reduced the homeownership
rate, but that the combination of no deductions with capital gains taxation
wouldhave resulted in a slightly higher proportion of homeowners.
These results provide some explanation for the puzzling behavior of the
homeownership ratio in the late 1970's. In that period ex post costs of
homeowning fell greatly relative to renting. Despite this, theaggregate
proportion of homeowners changed little. Our evidencesuggests that this
was largely due to the erratic nature of housing costs which madeownership
commitments unattractive.
The chief limitation of this analysis is its omission of therelationship
between housing and other financial decisions. From a theoreticalpoint of
view, one expects that the housing decision will be part of a broaderportfolio
allocation problem. As an empirical issue, the relevanze of thisconsideration
is not clear-—in 1966, only 50% of homeowning households had other assets worth
more than $1500. (Diamond and Hausman [1982]) Nevertheless, this is a topic
worthy of further investigation.29.
Appendix A
This appendix details the calculations of the forecast error va:iare of
a projection based on the simple average of the first five future observations.
We can write the process for generating prices as:
-
P÷-.i
= - + (A1)
where is assumed to be known.














c(k)1 ++ 2•••÷ (A.L)
c(O)1
The expected price, at time t is calculated by taking the-30.










Let w0, w1, w2, w3, w4 be weights. Then the 5 period weighted average
forecast error is:
4






c(k) Ut+2k ÷3 k=Ot+3
+w4k=Ot+
Collecting coefficients on the shocks:
3 2
= Ew1c(i) +. Ew.1c(i) +u2E w.2c(i)
i=O i0
1
÷ u13 Z w.+3c(1) +u÷4w4c(o)
i=0
Clearly E(e) =0.ThusVar() =E(e2).Since the u'sare independently,
identically, distributed, all covariance terms disappear and the result is:
— 2 Var(e) =a E ci. U• :i.





Inthe case referred to in the text, w. =1/5for all i -
31 -32.
Appendix B
This appendix describes the methodology used to construct our data series.
The source of our raw data is also documented. HS refers to Historical
Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (1975) and SA refers
to various editions of Statistical Abstract of the United States.
1. Proportion of owner—occupied dwellings, adjusted for demographic
compositiOfl 8
Three different sources of data were utilized. From 19Ll5 to 1959 the
iterative perpetual inventory method described in Rosen and Rosen (1980)
was used. From 1960 to 1973 data on the proportionof owner-occupied housing
starts were taken from Housing Vacancy Survey, U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Publication #111. From l97 to 1980, the owner-occupancy data were taken
from the Annual Housing Survey, U.S. Bureau of the Census and Departmentof
Housing and Urban Development. The owner-o:cupied rates werethen adjusted
for changing demographic composition of the population followingJaffee and
Rosen (1979).
2. Price of owner-occupied housing: P






where rt* is the AAA bond rate, Vt is the marketvalue of a house, Tt
is the property tax per single family housing unit, Dis depreciadon,
Mt is maintenance, Vis the expected capital gain, is the marginal
tax rate for the household with averagetaxable income, is t￿
share of owner's equity in the house, and is the implicit price deflator
for total consumption expenditures.
It was assumed r r-3.
The AAA bond rate series was taken from HS arci SA. Follcwing actual
real estate practice, depreciatior. and maintenance were each set at 1 percent
of the house's value. The tax rate was taken from Joines, 1Gl, •.210j.
After 1975, the 1975 tax rate of .lL79 was used.
The market value of owner-occupied housing, Vt ,wasderived L first
splicing two housing price ;eries and using the results to compute annual
rates of change of house prices, .Thevalues of were then applied
to census-year numbers on the median value of owner-occupied uni in :rdr
to derive an annual series comparable with the census-year numbers. In n
iterative process, the values of were changed proportionately untii the
values of the constructed price series for census years exactly matched those
of the census. Median values of owner-occupied units in census years were
found in HS. For 19,4 to 1956, was computed using FHA sales price data
as reported in various editions of the FHA Yearbook. For 1957 to 1980,
was calculated from various editions of Existing Home Sales, a publication of
the National Association of Realtors [1980].
The property tax per owner-occupied unit was calculated by dividing the
residential portion of all federal, state, and local property taxes by the




where is total property tax revenue, 1(R is net private residential
capital stock at current cost, KN is net private nonresidential capital stock
at current cost, and 0S is the number of owner-occupied units. For years
prior to 1971, these series were taken from HS; for 1971 to 1980, they
were from SA.34.
3. Price of rental housing:
An annual rate of change of the rental price of housing was computed using
the rental component of the CPI (HS prior to 1971, SA for 1971 to 1980).
This rate of change series was then applied to census-year numbers on the
median rent of renter-occupied units in order to derive an annual series
comparable with the census-year numbers. In an iterative process, the annual
changes in rental prices were adjusted until they exactly replicated the
census—yearnumbers.
4.Real consumption: C
Real per capital consumption expenditures were taken from the Economic
Report of the President (1982).
5. Real growth in deposits at savings and loan associations and mutual
savings banks: CREDt
The savings data were from HS forthe 1949 to 1970 and from SA for 1971
to 1980.
6. Quality adjustment for rental and owner-occupied housing.
An annual time series on the number of rooms in renter and owner—occupied
housing was developed from census data prior to 1973, and from the Annual
Housing Survey since 1973. The price variables for renter and owrier—occuped
housing were then recalculated on a per room basis.35.
References
Arcelus, Francisco and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Markets r :ousing and Hou3.
Services," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 5, No. 1, pt. 1, February
1973,pp.78—99.
Congressional Budget Office, The Tax Treatment of Horneownership: iSSUE
andOptions, Congress of the United States, September, 1981.
Box, G.E.P. and G. M. Jenkins, Time Series Analysis (San Francisco: Holde...-
Day), 1970.
Diamond, Peter A. and J. A. Hausrnan, "Individual Retirement andSavings
Behavior," rnimeo, M.I.T., August, 1982.
Dougherty, Ann and Robert Van Order, "Inflation, Housing Costs and the
Consumer Price Index," The American Economic Review, vol. 7 no. 1,
March, 1982, pp. 1541614.
Fair, Ray C. and Dwight M. Jaffee, "Methods of Estimation for Markets in
Disequilibrium," Econometrica 140,No.3, May, 1972, pp. 14g7_5lLl..
Feldstein, Martin, "Inflation, TaxRulesand the Accumulation of Residential
and Non-Residential Capital," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 814,
no. 2, 1982, pp. 293—311.
Feldstein, Martin S. and Lawrence Summers, "Inflation, TaxRules,and the
Long-Term Interest Rate," N.B.E.R. Working Paper No. 232, January, .978.
Friedman, Benjamin M., "Optimal Expectations and the Extreme Information
Assumptions of 'Rational Expectations' Macro-Models," Journal of Monetary
Economics 5, 1979, pp. 23-41.36.
Hendershott,Patric H., "Government Policies and the Allocation of Capital
between Residential and Industrial Uses," National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 1036, December, 1982.
Hendershott,Patric H. and James D. Shilling, "The Economics of Tenure Choice
1955-79," N.B.E.R. Working Paper No. 5'43, September, 1980.
Hendershott,Patric H. and Joel Slemrod, "Taxes and the User Cost of Capital
for Owner—Occupied Housing," mimeo, The Ohio State University, 1981.
Henderson, J. V. and Y. M. loannides, "A Model of Housing Tenure Choice,"
American Economic Review, vol. 73, no. 1, March, 1983, pp. 98-113.
Jaffee, Dwight M. and Kenneth T. Rosen, "Mortgage Credit Availability and
Residential Construction,'t Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2,
1979, pp. 333—76.
Joines, Douglas H., "Estimates of Effective Marginal TaxRateson Factor
Income," Jcarnal of Business, vol. 5L,no.2, 1981, pp. 191-226.
Jorgenson, Dale W., "Econometric Studies of Investment Behavior: A Survey,"
The Journal of Economic Literature 9, December 1971, pp. 1Ul_lltl.7.
Muth, Richard F., "The Demand for Non-Farm Housing," in The remand for flurabi
Goods, edited by Arnold C. Narberger, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1960.
National Association of Realtors, Existing Home Sales, Washington: National
Association of Realtors, 1980.
Nelson, Charles R., Applied Time Series Analysis for Managerial Forecstg,
San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1973.37.
Plosser, Charles, C. William Schwert and Halbert White, "Differencing As ..
Testof Specification," International Economic Peview, vol. 23, no. 3,
October, 1982, pp. 535—552.
Rosen, Harvey S., "Comments," in Aaron, H. J. and J. A. Pechman (eds.),
How Taxes Affect Economic Behavior. Brookings, pp. 323-326.
Rosen, Harvey S. and Kenneth T. Rosen, "Federal Taxes and Homeownership:
Evidence From Time Series," Journal of Political Economy 88, February,
1980, pp. 59—75.
Swan, Craig, "The Markets for Housing and Housing Services: A Comment,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 5, No. 4., November, 1973, pp. 960—72.
Tobin, James, "Liquidity Preference as Attitudes Toward Risk,"
Review of Economic Studies 25, February 1958, pp. 65-86.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Department of Housing & Urban Developnent, Annual
Housing Survey, U.s. Government Printing Office, 1g7L-198O.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States:
Colonial Times to 1970. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Housing Vacancy Survey, U.S. Government Printing
Office, 197L1.—1980.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, various editions.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. FRAYearbook.Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, various editions.
U.S. President, Economic Report of the President. Washington: U.S. Governnent
Printing Office, various issues.
Venti, Steven F. and David A. Wise, "Moving and Housing Expenditure:
Transactions Cos and Disequilibrium," Harvard University, mimeo, 1982.